The deadly pager explosions in Lebanon have once again highlighted Iran’s involvement in the regional anti-Israel axis, which includes Hezbollah. Thousands were injured when pagers used by Hezbollah members detonated simultaneously across Lebanon. The Iranian ambassador to Lebanon was also injured. The pagers were apparently provided to Hezbollah members by Iran as a secure communications alternative. After the explosions, Iran quickly sent medical support to Lebanon. Where is the country headed under its new President Massoud Peseschkian? Since his election, many have speculated that Iran’s strategy will change. He was repeatedly described as a “reformer” who would stand up to Iran’s conservatives, change the dynamic between Tehran and Washington and end some of the government’s social control measures, such as Internet censorship. His election is portrayed by many Western experts as a surprise because he defeated a conservative candidate and won the internal competition for the office.Peseschkian is a protector of the regimeAgainst this background, there is analysis within and outside the country about the extent of the change that Peseschkian could make a difference in the country’s political, social and economic affairs. There is also speculation about the challenges he will face if he tries to change political direction. But this debate overlooks the most important factor in Peseschkian’s victory, namely the approval of the Guardian Council. The council that oversees Iran’s electoral processes is directly controlled by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Therefore, it is wrong to classify Peseschkian as a “moderate” and “reformer” who promises to fundamentally change the strategic direction of the Islamic Republic. Peseschkian is a regime insider. He is loyal to the institution of the Supreme Leader. Before the elections, he had to confirm his unconditional loyalty to the political ideology of the Islamic Republic and the Council as a condition for their approval of his eligibility to vote. For this reason, oppositional sections of society perceive him more as a protector of the regime than as a protector of the people. This was also reflected in the low voter turnout.The Supreme Leader’s Unfettered PowerAny analysis of the possible impact of the past presidential elections on aspects of policy-making in Iran must keep in mind the existing power structure and political decision-making processes. In this structure, the Supreme Leader’s Office, made up of Khamenei’s inner circle of advisers and confidants, holds ultimate power in Iran. Many in the West tend to discredit such analysis. They believe that “Khamenei is not a puppet master.” According to this view, the political system in Iran consists of various consensus-building mechanisms. But that is misleading because the so-called mechanisms for reaching consensus are also controlled by the institution of the Supreme Leader. The highest consensus-building body in Iran is the Supreme National Security Council. According to Article 176 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, the Council’s decisions can only be implemented if they have been approved by the Supreme Leader. In Iran’s current political structure, he is not a person but an institution made up of a small number of people trusted by Khamenei and his close inner circle (including his son Mojtaba). This institution has a military arm, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Together they stand above all other state institutions in Iran. There can be no question of separation of powers and effective control. Mourning in Beirut: Hundreds of explosions from Hezbollah militia communications equipment have killed at least 37 people and injured more than 2,900.dpaDirect orders and communiqués issued by the Supreme Leader’s office to set the broad lines of policy are has become the norm in Iran in recent decades. These orders are mostly aimed at what Khamenei personally calls the “re-revolution” of Iran. The office dictates its vision to all other political institutions, including the parliament and the presidency. Clear evidence of this is the economic policies of the past decade that promote “economic jihad,” “economic resistance” against Iran’s foreign policy enemies, and the appointment of “jihadi” managers – all concepts first introduced by Khamenei .The economy is also only a means to an endDespite the increasing economic pressure at home, the government has primarily geared the allocation of state resources to promoting its strategic power. Low growth, high inflation, the state’s monopoly on almost all profitable economic activities, corruption and nepotism, high poverty rates and declining living standards, as well as sanctions have affected every aspect of the lives of citizens in Iran. Despite all these economic challenges, the government has persisted in pursuing costly strategic projects throughout the Middle East region that have required priority allocation of resources while ignoring domestic political challenges. Abroad, the regime supports Lebanese Hezbollah Militia that is attacking Israel with increasing severity, the Syrian Assad regime, the Shiite “Popular Mobilization Units” in Iraq and the Houthi rebels in Yemen who repeatedly attack ships. The Office of the Supreme Leader has promoted narratives, policies and appointments that support the existing structure and are likely to outlive him. Peseschkian and his government will not change this.Who could replace the Supreme Leader?The Supreme Leader, not the president, will be the most important factor that could change the political direction of the Islamic Republic in the next few years. Given Khamenei’s 85-year-old age, the transition to the next leader could coincide with Peseschkian’s presidency. The transition of power to Khamenei is likely to pose a challenge for the system, especially since there is no obvious successor candidate. The new president’s predecessor, Ebrahim Raisi, who recently died in a helicopter crash, was one of the few remaining figures who had the potential to replace Khamenei. His death highlighted the succession crisis. In recent years, Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of the Supreme Leader, has often been mentioned as a contender for the post. After Peseschkian’s election, posters showing Peseschkian and Mojtaba in one picture were put up in the streets of various cities. Although the banners contain no text, they are interpreted as a campaign to prepare the public for a major event. Khamenei’s legacy, his efforts to personalize executive power and maintain his policies will remain in the hands of his successor. In the current domestic political dynamic, senior IRGC leaders are expected to play a key role in the transition of the Supreme Leader’s power. Khamenei’s successor may also need Peseschkian’s support. For this reason, its main mandate is to maintain the long-term stability of the regime and not to change economic, social and foreign policy in the medium term. Long-term stability may require political change, both domestically and internationally. However, it is currently unclear what such changes might entail. All in all, the prospects for change under Peseschkian are limited. He is another “yes man” chosen by the Supreme Leader’s institution to serve the regime’s interests. The expected political orientation of his government can be seen in several strategies: Raisi’s Eastern policy is likely to be continued with the expansion of relations with China and Russia. More on the topic The government will seek further normalization of relations with the Gulf states. It will continue to support proxies in the region (Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen) and maintain hostility towards Israel. In the country, she will maintain social restrictions such as compulsory veiling. And it is likely to adopt an economic policy that offers groups and personalities close to the state opportunities for enrichment. Iran’s relations with Europe and especially with Germany are unlikely to improve under Peseschkian. Iran will continue to support Russia in its war of aggression against Ukraine. Ultimately, Peseschkian is unable to change Iran’s nuclear strategy. This is determined primarily by the Office of the Supreme Leader. In any negotiations with the US to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran will continue enriching uranium to weapons-grade levels to exert pressure and reach a better agreement.
Dr. Sara Bazoobandi
Sara Bazoobandi is a researcher at the Institute for Middle East Studies of the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA) in Hamburg. One of her focuses is on Iran.
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